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Background: The Cognitive Avoidance Theory of Worry argues that worry is a cognitive strategy adopted to
control the physiological arousal associated with anxiety. According to this theory, pathological worry, as in
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), is verbal in nature, negative and abstract, rather than concrete.
Neuroimaging studies link the expression of worry to characteristic modes of brain functional connectivity,
especially in relation to the amygdala. However, the distinctive features of worry (verbal, abstract, negative),
and their relationship to physiological arousal, have not so far been mapped to brain function.
Methods: We addressed this omission by undertaking a resting-state functional magnetic resonance neuroima-
ging study of 19 patients with GAD and 21 controls, before and after induction of perseverative cognitions, while
measuring emotional bodily arousal from heart rate (HR). Seed-based analyses quantified brain changes in whole
brain functional connectivity from the amygdala.
Results: In GAD, the induction increased negative thoughts and their verbal content. In line with predictions, the
verbal expression of worry in GAD was associated with higher HR at baseline and attenuated HR increases after
induction of perseverative cognitions. Within brain, the increased use of words during worry, and the associated
dampening of HR after induction were mediated by the strength of functional connectivity between the
amygdala and default mode network ‘hubs’ and the opercular cortex. The negative content of worry was further
related to functional communication between amygdala and cingulo-opercular and temporal cortices.
Conclusions: Findings provide a neurobiological basis for the impact of verbal worry on HR in GAD.
1. Introduction
Worry describes repetitive thoughts about potentially negative
events in the future. Although worry is common to almost everybody's
experience, it becomes chronic and uncontrollable in Generalized
Anxiety Disorder (GAD; DSM-5, American Psychiatric Association,
2013). One puzzle underlying pathological worry is why individuals
engage in this form of cognition in the absence of evidence that it serves
an adaptive purpose.
The Cognitive Avoidance Theory of Worry is an influential account
for understanding why patients with GAD spend so much time
worrying. This theory proposes that worry is implemented by patients
as an avoidance strategy, aimed at controlling physiological arousal
engendered by anxiety (Borkovec, 1994; Borkovec et al., 2004). Pa-
thological worry is typically verbal: both healthy and psychopatholo-
gical individuals shift the nature of their cognitions towards negative
verbal thoughts when instructed to think about a current concern
(Behar et al., 2005; Borkovec and Inz, 1990; Stöber et al., 2000).
Moreover, successful therapeutic outcomes for patients with GAD are
accompanied by reduction in the ratio between reported words and
mental imagery (Borkovec and Inz, 1990). Consistent with the model,
verbal articulation of fearful thoughts attenuates cardiovascular
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reactivity, whereas mental imagery of the same material elicits ex-
aggerated cardiovascular responses (e.g., Borkovec and Hu, 1990;
Borkovec et al., 1993; Hazlett-Stevens and Borkovec, 2001; Peasley-
Miklus and Vrana, 2000; Vrana et al., 1989). Lastly, in support of the
notion that individuals with GAD use their worry to try to control
emotional arousal, when asked why they worry, patients answer that
‘worry helps distract me from more emotional topics’ or ‘prepare for the
worst’ (Borkovec and Roemer, 1995; Davey et al., 1996; Freeston et al.,
1994). Nevertheless, this mechanism can also explain the chronic
nature of anxiety in GAD patients: the reduction in emotional proces-
sing following ‘successful’ verbal worrying limits exposure to anxiety-
provoking material, and thereby prevents normal adaptive habituation
(Borkovec et al., 2004). Despite this evidence supporting the Cognitive
Avoidance Theory, not all studies show attenuated physiological
arousal during worry (see Ottaviani et al., 2016a for a meta-analysis)
and alternative theoretical explanations have emerged (e.g., the Con-
trast Avoidance Model by Newman and Llera, 2011).
Our study combined functional brain imaging with peripheral
physiological monitoring to test for a hypothesized association between
worry and up-regulation of regions linked to language and cognitive
control processes (including lateral prefrontal cortex and inferior
frontal gyrus) with concurrent down-regulation of brain regions im-
plicated in affective processing and emotion-related cardiovascular re-
activity. This work extends previous observations regarding the neu-
robiological signatures of pathological worry that are consistent with
the Cognitive Avoidance Theory of Worry. A negative association be-
tween worry scores and amygdala-prefrontal functional connectivity
was observed after a worry induction, suggesting efficient top down
suppression of fearful imagery associated with the worry (Meeten et al.,
2016). Moreover, stronger engagement of the prefrontal cortex (re-
flected by increased connectivity with bilateral amygdala) is associated
with attenuation of dysregulated autonomic arousal during worry in
individuals with GAD, confirming that worry may act as to suppress
physiologic arousal in this clinical population (Makovac et al., 2016b).
Building on these results, our study aimed to characterize patterns
of resting state functional connectivity in relation to the modality of
participants' thoughts during worry in patients with GAD and healthy
controls. We employed a validated measure of ongoing cognition, the
New York Cognition Questionnaire (NYC-Q; Gorgolewski et al., 2014,
see also Sanders et al., 2017). The questionnaire has established utility
in neuroimaging studies, where self-generated verbal cognitions, across
a large normative sample, were inversely associated with engagement
of regions of retrosplenial cortex closely linked to the hippocampus
(Gorgolewski et al., 2014). In our study, we specifically tested how the
content and form of worry, measured by the NYC-Q, related to the
functional connectivity of the amygdala at rest and bodily arousal in-
dexed by heart rate (HR). We focused on the dimensions of the NYC-Q
that measure well-recognized characteristics of worrisome thoughts
(i.e., verbal, abstract/vague, and negative). To obtain measures of
bodily arousal and the form of thoughts during worry, a behavioural
induction of perseverative cognition was used. We predicted that the
induced worry would be predominantly verbal, negative, and vague
particularly in individuals with GAD. Considering that functional con-
nectivity under multiple mental states is essential to disentangle con-
nectivity differences that are transient versus those that represent more
stable, trait-like characteristics of an individual (Geerligs et al., 2015),
we measured functional connectivity at rest, and also quantified
changes in functional connectivity from pre to post-induction of per-
severative cognitions. As hypothesized by the Cognitive Avoidance
Theory of Worry, we predicted that there are differences in amygdala
functional connectivity during verbal, compared to imagery-related,
worry and that these differences are linked to attenuation of physio-
logical arousal after worry induction. Borkovec's Theory not only de-
scribes worrisome thoughts as verbal, but also as negative and abstract
in nature; therefore, we also tested how distinct patterns of amygdala
functional connectivity were associated with these specific features of
worry. Previous findings linking resting state functional connectivity in
healthy individuals to dimensions of the NYC-Q, led us to broadly
predict that functional connectivity to the limbic region and to default
mode network (DMN) respectively would be associated with more ne-
gative and more abstract thoughts.
2. Methods and materials
2.1. Participants
The present study is based on a secondary analysis of data from a
larger longitudinal functional magnetic imaging (fMRI) study (Makovac
et al., 2016a, 2016b, 2016c; Meeten et al., 2016; Ottaviani et al.,
2016b). Nineteen patients (17 women, 2 men; mean age = 29.58 ±
6.93 years) who met diagnostic criteria for GAD and 21 healthy con-
trols (HC; 18 women, 3 men; mean age = 28.67 ± 9.45 years) parti-
cipated in the study. Only 1 participant was non-Caucasian. Patients
and HC were recruited from public advertisement. All participants were
right-handed, native English speakers, and had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. Exclusion criteria were: age below 18 years, past head
injury or neurological disorders, history of major medical or psychiatric
disorder (other than GAD and co-morbid depression in the patients),
cognitive impairment, history of substance or alcohol abuse or depen-
dence, heart disease, obesity (body mass index > 30 kg/m2), preg-
nancy, claustrophobia or other MRI exclusions. None of the participants
had a formal diagnosis of comorbid major depressive disorder. Two
patients with GAD were included who took long-term medication (1
Citalopram, 1 Pregabalin) at the time of the study. All other participants
were medication free. All participants provided written informed con-
sent. The study was approved by the National Research Ethics Service
(NRES) with local approval the Brighton and Sussex Medical School
Research Governance and Ethics Committee. Participants were com-
pensated for their time.
2.2. Procedure
The Structured Clinical Interview for DSMIV (SCID) was adminis-
tered to patients and controls to confirm/exclude the diagnosis of GAD.
Participants then completed a series of online sociodemographic and
dispositional traits questionnaires. Participants were subsequently fa-
miliarized with the neuroimaging environment, connected to the phy-
siological recording equipment, and then underwent the MRI protocol.
2.3. Questionnaires
Each participant completed a set of questionnaires accessing socio-
demographic and lifestyle information (nicotine, alcohol, and caffeine
consumption, physical activity), and dispositional measures of: 1) de-
pressive mood (Beck Depression Inventory, BDI; Beck et al., 1961); 2)
anxious worry (Penn State Worry Questionnaire, PSWQ; Meyer et al.,
1990); 3) depressive rumination (Ruminative Response Scale, RRS;
Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow, 1991); and 4) state and trait anxiety
(Spielberger State Trait Anxiety Inventory, STAI; Spielberger, 1989).
The New York Cognition Questionnaire (NYC-Q; Gorgolewski et al.,
2014) was used to assess content and form of worry during the resting
state period following the perseverative cognition induction. All parti-
cipants completed the questionnaire at the end of MRI scanning session,
immediately after the last resting state scan. For each question (e.g.,
“During the task my thoughts were in the form of words”), participants
are asked to indicate how well each statement described their thoughts
on a scale from 1 - Completely did not describe my thoughts to 9 -
Completely did describe my thoughts.
Scoring followed a previously described procedure (Gorgolewski
et al., 2014): questions were decomposed using exploratory factor
analysis to find interpretable latent components and the number of
factors was estimated using parallel analysis (Horn, 1965). Factors were
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estimated using principal axis factor analysis. Individual-level scores
were the calculated (ten Berge et al., 1999). After obtaining a weight
matrix, individual-level question scores were transformed into in-
dividual-level factor scores. Given our specific hypothesis on the verbal,
abstract, and negative form of worry (Borkovec, 1994), other dimen-
sions of the NYC-Q (past/future, positive, and social) were not entered
into our analyses.
2.4. Experimental design
In the scanner, each participant underwent a series of four 5-min
resting state periods, each followed by a 6-min easy visuomotor
tracking task (described elsewhere; Ottaviani et al., 2016b). During
resting state periods the participant was instructed to rest with eyes
open without thinking of anything and not falling asleep. After the
second or third resting block, randomly, the participant underwent a
recorded verbal induction procedure designed to engender persevera-
tive cognition:
‘Next I would like you to recall an episode that happened in the past year
that made you feel sad, anxious, or stressed or something that may happen in
the future that worries you. Then, I would like you to think about this episode
in detail, for example about its possible causes, consequences, and your
feelings about it. Please keep thinking about this until the end of the next
tracking task. Thank you. Please take as much time as you need to recall the
episode and press the button whenever you are ready.’
The rationale for collapsing worrisome and ruminative thoughts
into a single phenomenal category (i.e. perseverative cognition) is
corroborated by studies showing no differences between these two
processes on their impact on appraisals and strategies (Segerstrom
et al., 2000; Watkins et al., 2005) and by the incremental benefits of
using perseverative cognition as a transdiagnostic symptom (McEvoy
et al., 2013; Spinhoven et al., 2015).
2.5. Physiological data processing
Heartbeats were monitored using MRI-compatible finger pulse oxi-
metry (8600FO; Nonin Medical), recorded digitally as physiological
waveforms (via a CED power 1401, using Spike2 v7 software;
Cambridge Electronic, Design CED). Pulse data were manually checked
and corrected for artifacts.
To quantify the impact of the induction on cardiac activity, change
scores (Δ HR) were computed by subtracting the average HR before the
induction from the average HR after the induction.
2.6. MRI acquisition and preprocessing
MRI images were acquired on a 1.5-Tesla Siemens Magnetom
Avanto scanner. Structural volumes were obtained using the high-re-
solution three-dimension magnetization-prepared rapid gradient-echo
sequence (HiResMPRAGE). Functional datasets used T2*weighted
echoplanar imaging (EPI) sensitive to blood oxygenation level depen-
dent (BOLD) signal (TR = 2.52 s, TE = 43 ms, flip-angle 90°, 34 slices,
3 mm slice thickness, 192 mm FOV, voxel size 3 × 3 × 3 mm).
Data were pre-processed using Statistical Parametric Mapping
(Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience; SPM8, http://www.
fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/), and in-house software implemented in Matlab
(Mathworks Inc., Natick, Massachussetts, USA). For each participant,
the first four volumes of the fMRI series were discarded to allow for T1
equilibration effects. The pre-processing steps included correction for
head motion, compensation for slice-dependent time shifts, normal-
ization to the EPI template in standard space (MNI) coordinates pro-
vided with SPM8, and smoothing with a 3D Gaussian Kernel with
8 mm3 full-width at half maximum. The global temporal drift was re-
moved using a 3rd order polynomial fit. To remove other potential
sources of bias, data was further filtered regressing against the rea-
lignment parameters. As global signal removal can potentially change
functional connectivity distributions and result in increased negative
correlations (Saad et al., 2012), it was avoided in our pre-processing.
Translational movement in millimeters (x, y, z) and rotational motion
in degrees (pitch, roll, yaw) was calculated based on the SPM8 para-
meters for motion correction. None of the participants had a maximum
absolute shift > 2 mm translation or exceed 1.5° of maximum absolute
rotation. Then, all images were filtered by a phase-insensitive band-pass
filter (pass band 0.01–0.08 Hz) to reduce the effect of low frequency
drift and high frequency physiological noise.
2.7. Statistical analyses
All data are expressed as means (± SD). Differences at p≤ 0.05 are
regarded as significant. Data analysis was performed with SPSS 22.0 for
Windows (SPSS Inc., USA). There were no baseline group differences on
self-report socio-demographic measures (Makovac et al., 2016a).
Correlation analysis was performed to examine the associations
between NYC-Q factors and HR and validated measures of worry, ru-
mination and anxiety. To spot disease-specificity in content and form of
perseverative cognition, intercorrelations among NYC-Q factors were
performed separately for the GAD and HC groups.
A Spearman correlation was run to assess the associations between
NYC-Q factors and HR, and for dispositional measures of anxiety,
worry, depressive symptoms, and depressive rumination.
2.8. Seed-based fMRI analysis
Anatomical ROIs for bilateral amygdala were constructed using an
anatomical toolbox in SPM (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/
software/spm8/). The average resting state fMRI time-series over the
ROIs were extracted for patients with GAD and HC. This time series
were then used as a regressor in a 1st level SPM analysis, extracting the
voxels in the brain showing a significant correlation with it (Makovac
et al., 2016a, 2016b, 2016c). Statistical threshold was set at p < 0.05 -
FWE-corrected at cluster level (cluster size defined using uncorrected
voxel-level threshold p < 0.001).
A direct comparison between baseline functional connectivity in the
two groups as well as results of the Group by Time interaction have
been already described elsewhere and will not be repeated here
(Makovac et al., 2016b). Similarly, the effectiveness of induction in
eliciting significant increase in worrisome thoughts in both groups has
already been reported (Makovac et al., 2016a).
t-Tests were used to test for association between amygdala func-
tional connectivity at baseline (i.e., before the induction) and the
content and form of thoughts and cardiac reactivity after the induction,
with Group (GAD vs. HC) as the between-subject variable and NYC-Q
factors and Δ HR as covariates of interest.
We further calculated the shift in amygdala functional connectivity
from pre to post-induction in the two groups (Δ functional connectivity;
post minus pre-induction), and correlated this Δ functional connectivity
with NYC-Q factors, to investigate whether the impact of a persevera-
tive cognition induction on the brain could be associated with the
specific form of thoughts in response to the induction.
Following the specific hypothesis regarding the verbal form of
worry dampening cardiovascular reactivity (Borkovec et al., 2004),
scores on the Words factor of the NYC-Q (indicating how much parti-
cipants were thinking in words) and the impact of the induction on HR
(Δ HR) were entered into the same model to test for mediation by
shared regional neural substrates. To do so, the Words by Δ HR inter-
action was entered as covariate of interest and Group (GAD vs. HC) was
entered as the between-subject variable in two models having respec-
tively amygdala functional connectivity at baseline and Δ functional
connectivity as outcome.
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3. Results
3.1. Questionnaires
Individuals within the GAD group had significantly higher baseline
scores on the PSWQ, the STAI, and the RRS when compared to the HC
group. Moreover, patients with GAD had overall higher HR when
compared to HC. Perseverative cognition induction significantly in-
creased HR in both groups (Makovac et al., 2016b).
Based on the NYC-Q, patients with GAD reported more negative
thoughts than HC (Negative factor, t(38) = 2.73, p < 0.01). No other
significant group differences in the form and content of thoughts
emerged (Fig. 1).
3.2. Correlations between NYC-Q factors, anxiety, and heart rate
In GAD patients, an increase in reported negative thoughts was
accompanied by an increase in the number of verbal thoughts.
Conversely in HC, an increase in negative thoughts was accompanied by
an increase in the number of thoughts in the form of images, which
were also described as more vague/less specific. Negative thinking was
positively correlated with levels of depression (BDI), state and trait
anxiety (STAI), worry (PSWQ), and depressive rumination (RRS)
(Table 1).
Verbal thoughts also correlated positively with levels of depression
(BDI), state and trait anxiety (STAI), baseline HR (pre-induction) and
correlated negatively with HR changes from pre to post-induction (Δ
HR). Thinking in images correlated positively with state anxiety (STAI).
No correlation emerged between having vague thoughts and any of the
other examined variables.
3.3. Associations between the use of words vs images during perseverative
cognition and baseline amygdala functional connectivity
We tested to see if baseline functional connectivity with amygdala
was differently associated with increase in verbal or imagery thoughts
after perseverative cognition induction in GAD and controls. No cor-
relations between thinking in words or images and the functional
connectivity of either the left or right amygdala seed emerged.
3.4. Associations between the use of words vs images during perseverative
cognition and pre to post induction changes in amygdala functional
connectivity
We next tested to see if pre- to post-induction changes in functional
connectivity with amygdala was differently associated with changes in
verbal or imagery thoughts after perseverative cognition induction in
GAD and controls. Across groups, more verbal thoughts were associated
with increased functional connectivity between left amygdala and right
precentral gyrus following induction (Table 2, Fig. 2).
3.5. Associations between increased use of words and reduced cardiac
reactivity during perseverative cognition and baseline amygdala functional
connectivity
We tested whether baseline functional connectivity with amygdala
mediates both increase in verbal thoughts and reduced cardiac re-
activity during perseverative cognition. Changes in functional con-
nectivity between left amygdala and precuneus expressed a significant
Words × Δ HR interaction. Across both groups of participants, this ef-
fect was driven principally by the co-expression of a positive correlation
with verbal thinking with a negative correlation with increased HR.
Thus stronger left amygdala connectivity with this brain region was
associated on one hand with more thoughts in the form of words and on
the other hand with decreases in HR following perseverative cognition
induction (Table 2, Fig. 3, 1A).
A Words × Δ HR interaction was also observed across groups for
right amygdala functional connectivity with frontotemporal cortices,
namely left superior frontal gyrus, left middle frontal gyrus, and bi-
lateral temporal fusiform cortex. This effect was driven principally by a
negative correlation with Δ HR, meaning that a stronger connectivity
Fig. 1. Differences between patients with Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) and
Healthy Controls (HC) on the examined New York Cognition Questionnaire (NYC-Q)
factors.
Table 1
Spearman's intercorrelations among NYC-Q factors in the two groups and Spearman's
intercorrelations between NYC-Q factors and a) depression (BDI), b) trait and state
measures of anxiety (STAI), c) trait rumination (RRS), d) trait worry (PSWQ); and e)
cardiac responses at baseline and in response to the induction.
Words Images Negative Vague
GAD Words −0.20 0.56⁎ −0.34
Images −0.20 0.40 0.14
Negative 0.56⁎ 0.40 −0.14
Vague −0.34 0.14 −0.14
HC Words −0.12 0.40 0.24
Images −0.12 0.48⁎ −0.46⁎
Negative 0.40 0.48⁎ −0.23
Vague 0.24 −0.46⁎ −0.23
BDI PSWQ RRS STAIy1 STAIy2
Words 0.39⁎ 0.22 0.38⁎ 0.43⁎⁎ 0.35⁎
Images 0.13 0.21 0.12 0.33⁎ 0.23
Negative 0.54⁎⁎ 0.41⁎⁎ 0.49⁎⁎ 0.61⁎⁎ 0.55⁎⁎
Vague −0.05 −0.07 −0.02 0.04 −0.05
HR HR
Words 0.38⁎ −0.32
Images −0.04 −0.13
Negative 0.29 −0.17
Vague −0.06 −0.10
⁎ p < 0.01.
⁎⁎ p < 0.001. GAD = Generalized anxiety disorder; HC = Healthy controls;
BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; PSWQ= Penn State Worry Questionnaire;
RRS = Ruminative Response Scale; STAI Y1 = state subscale of the State-trait anxiety
inventory; STAI Y2 = trait subscale of the State-trait anxiety inventory.
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between these brain regions was associated with decreases in HR fol-
lowing perseverative cognition induction (Table 2, Fig. 3, 1B).
There were group differences in neural interactions between the
form of thoughts and physiological arousal: i.e. significant Words × Δ
HR× Group interaction was evident for right amygdala functional
connectivity with right parietal opercular cortex. This effect was driven
by a negative correlation with Words and a positive correlation with HR
change in patients with GAD compared to controls. Participants with
GAD who responded to the induction with more verbal thought than
imagery and who also experienced a decrease in HR, manifest weaker
functional connectivity between right amygdala and parietal oper-
culum. The opposite pattern emerged in HC (Table 2, Fig. 3, 1C).
3.6. Associations between increased use of words and reduced cardiac
reactivity during perseverative cognition and pre to post induction changes in
amygdala functional connectivity
We then tested for associations between pre- to post-induction
changes in amygdala functional connectivity and more negative
thoughts and reduced cardiac reactivity during perseverative cognition
in GAD and controls. Significant interactions emerged for the pre- to
post-induction changes in functional connectivity between right
amygdala and right frontal pole (driven by a positive correlation with
Words), and between right amygdala and a cluster comprising left
frontal pole, brainstem/cerebellum, right inferior temporal gyrus, right
Table 2
Brain areas showing significant associations between baseline or pre- to post-induction changes in amygdala functional connectivity (Δ FC) and the examined New York Cognition
Questionnaire (NYC-Q) factors, the shift in HR from pre- to post-induction (Δ HR), and the interaction of these two variables.
Cluster Voxel
Contrast of interest Brain area Seed k p FWE Side T MNI xyz
(1) WORDS
ΔFC (post-pre induction)
Pos. correlation with WORDS
Precentral gyrus LA 131 0.012 R 6.17 34–16 50
(2) WORDS × ΔHR
Baseline
WORDS ×△HR
Precuneus 270 0.000 R 4.86 16–54 48
Superior frontal gyrus RA 305 0.001 L 5.09 −20 36 54
Middle frontal gyrus L 5.00 −38 26 46
Temporal fusiform cortex 308 0.017 R 5.08 40–18 -30
Temporal fusiform cortex 105 0.002 L 4.85 −36 -14 -34
Words/Images factor × Group (GAD, HC)
Parietal opercular cortex RA 184 0.003 R 4.63 42–26 16
ΔFC (post-pre induction)
WORDS ×△HR
Frontal pole RA 112 0.025 R 5.28 26 48–2
Frontal pole 1482 0.000 L 6.15 −28 48 36
Cerebelllum 464 0.000 L 5.65 −2 -40− 16
Inferior temporal gyrus 135 0.000 R 5.45 50–56 -18
Middle temporal gyrus 207 0.001 R 5.16 56–22 -10
Putamen 124 0.000 R 5.42 32–4 -12
Lat occipital cortex 151 0.006 R 4.97 30–74 -28
Precentral gyrus LA 144 0.006 R 6.33 38–12 52
Cerebellum, V 242 0.000 L 6.40 -16 -44 -18
Paracingulate gyrus 158 0.022 R 3.68 10 24 36
Superior frontal gyrus 215 0.000 L 6.14 −8 -38 52
Posterior inf temporal gyrus 198 0.000 R 6.04 46–28 -10
Temporooccipital inf temporal gyrus 192 0.004 R 5.97 56–66 -10
Words/Images factor × Group (GAD, HC)
Precentral gyrus RA/LA 163 0.003 L 5.86 −44 -18 62
Postcentral gyrus L 5.14 −52 -18 52
Occipital cortex 181 0.002 R 5.24 52–72 -8
124 0.016 R 5.34 28 38 30
Sup frontal gyrus 167 0.002 R 4.97 12 34 50
(3) NEGATIVE
Baseline
Group × NEGATIVE interaction
Temporal pole LA 233 0.001 R 6.14 26 10–30
Middle temporal gyrus 162 0.007 R 4.90 50 4–26
Central opercular cortex 185 0.003 L 5.97 −50 6–4
121 0.029 R 4.32 58 2 4
ΔFC (post-pre induction)
Neg. correlation with NEGATIVE
Anterior cingulate cortex RA 104 0.041 L 6.16 −12 38 18
(4) VAGUE
Baseline
Neg. correlation with VAGUE
LA 349 0.000 R 5.37 0 50–10
ΔFC (post-pre induction)
Precuneus 74 0.014 R 4,59 6–46 14
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middle temporal gyrus, putamen, and right lateral occipital cortex
(driven by a negative correlation with Words and positive with Δ HR).
Thus, participants who responded to the induction with thoughts
characterized by more words than images and had a decrease in HR,
also increased functional coupling between right amygdala and right
frontal pole and decreased functional coupling between right amygdala
and the other brain regions (see Table 2 for the complete list of brain
areas; Fig. 3, 2A).
A Words x Δ HR interaction was also found for the Δ left amygdala
functional connectivity between and cerebellum, right paracingulate
gyrus, left superior frontal gyrus and temporal areas. Participants who
responded to the induction with thoughts characterized by more words
than images and a decrease in HR, showed a decrease in functional
connectivity between left amygdala and cerebellum, right para-
cingulate gyrus, left superior frontal gyrus, and temporal areas (Table 2;
Fig. 3, 2A) and in functional connectivity between left amygdala and
precentral gyrus from pre to post-induction (Table 2, Fig. 3, 2B).
A Words x Δ HR x Group interaction was found for functional
connectivity between bilateral amygdala with precentral and post-
central gyri, occipital cortex, and frontal areas (see Table 2 for a de-
tailed list of brain areas), driven by a positive correlation with Words
and a negative correlation with the change in HR in patients with GAD.
Thus, patients who responded to the induction with a relative increase
in verbal thoughts accompanied by a decrease in HR, showed an in-
creased functional coupling between amygdala (bilaterally) and these
brain regions (Fig. 3, 2C).
3.7. Associations between negative quality to thoughts during perseverative
cognition and baseline amygdala functional connectivity
We next tested for associations between baseline functional con-
nectivity with amygdala and an increase in negative thoughts after
perseverative cognition induction in GAD and controls. No significant
associations emerged.
A Negative × Group interaction was observed for the functional
connectivity between left amygdala and right temporal pole, right
middle temporal gyrus and bilateral central opercular cortex, driven by
a positive correlation in GAD and a negative correlation in HC. Whereas
patients with GAD who had more negative thoughts had a stronger
functional connectivity between these regions, the opposite pattern
emerged in HC (Fig. 4, upper panel).
3.8. Associations between negative quality to thoughts during perseverative
cognition and pre to post-induction changes in amygdala functional
connectivity
We tested to see if pre- to post-induction changes in amygdala
functional connectivity were associated with increases in negative
worrisome thoughts in GAD and controls. Negative thoughts were as-
sociated with diminished pre to post-induction functional connectivity
between right amygdala and anterior cingulate cortex (Fig. 4, lower
panel).
3.9. Associations between vague/specific thoughts during worry and
baseline amygdala functional connectivity
We tested for the association between baseline functional con-
nectivity with amygdala and the presence of more vague thoughts after
worry induction in GAD and controls.
A significant negative correlation suggested that having more
vague, and less specific, thoughts was associated with reduced func-
tional connectivity between left amygdala and right frontal medial
cortex (Fig. 5, upper panel).
3.10. Associations between vague/specific thoughts during perseverative
cognition and pre to post-induction changes in amygdala functional
connectivity
Lastly, we tested whether pre to post-induction changes in func-
tional connectivity with amygdala were associated with the occurrence
of more vague thoughts after perseverative cognition induction in GAD
and controls. We found a different pattern of connectivity supporting
the level of detail in thought content following the induction. We ob-
served positive correlations between Vague and the Δ functional con-
nectivity (post-pre induction) between right amygdala and precuneus.
This pattern means that participants who described their thoughts as
more vague rather than specific responded to the induction by in-
creasing the functional connectivity between these areas (Fig. 5, lower
panel).
4. Discussion
This study tested hypotheses and mechanisms arising out of the
Cognitive Avoidance Theory of Worry, by linking the content and the
Fig. 2. Upper panel: brain regions showing significant correlations between the ‘Words’ factor of the New York Cognition Questionnaire (NYC-Q) and the shift in amygdala FC from pre-
to post-induction (Δ FC) in HC and patients with GAD.
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form of thoughts and cardiac responses evoked by a perseverative
cognition induction to measures of neural connectivity associated with
the amygdala in patients with GAD and controls. As predicted, worri-
some thoughts were more negative in individuals with a diagnosis of
GAD compared to non-pathological participants. In patients with GAD,
more negative thoughts were characterized by the use of more words.
This pattern is consistent with previous reports that people with clinical
levels of worry experience more verbal negative thoughts than healthy
volunteers (Borkovec and Inz, 1990; Hirsch et al., 2012). Across groups,
thinking in words was associated with higher baseline heart rate and
reduced cardiac reactivity after the perseverative cognition induction.
Contrary to what emerged in the pathological GAD group, healthy
participants who reported more negative thoughts described the latter
more in the form of images and as being vague. No association between
the verbal nature of worry and negative valence was evident in the
control group, suggesting that non-pathological worry can take the
form of imagery (Bergman and Craske, 2000; Stokes and Hirsch, 2010).
For example, individuals with dispositional tendencies to worry report
increases in negative thought intrusions when instructed to worry
verbally and a decrease in negative intrusions when trained to worry in
images (Stokes and Hirsch, 2010).
In line with the hypothesis that verbal worrying reflects attempts to
control emotional aspects of anxiety, more negative verbal thoughts
after the induction was correlated with higher levels of dispositional
rumination, depressive symptoms, and state and trait anxiety. This as-
sociation did not emerge for trait worry, which was instead significantly
associated with more negative thoughts. The lack of statistical sig-
nificance is likely due to the fact that negative thoughts were more
verbal in nature only in patients with GAD and not in controls, thus
obscuring the result on a dimensional level. According to the notion
that worrying in images is more adaptive as it elicits the physiological
anxiety needed for habituation, thinking in images after the induction
was only associated with higher levels of state -but not trait- anxiety.
Together, our behavioural and self-reported data are consistent with
Borkovec's Cognitive Avoidance Theory of Worry, which states that
worrisome thinking in GAD is verbal in nature with the aim to avoid
fear-inducing mental imagery and concomitant physiological arousal.
The Cognitive Avoidance Theory of Worry was further supported by
our neuroimaging and physiological findings. Strong engagement of the
prefrontal cortex (reflected by increased connectivity with bilateral
amygdala) is associated with the attenuation of dysregulated autonomic
arousal during worry in GAD (Makovac et al., 2016b). Here, we extend
these observations by characterizing how the form (words, images,
vague) and valence of worrisome thoughts exclusively influence the
Fig. 3. Upper panel: brain regions showing a significant interaction between the ‘Words’ factor of the New York Cognition Questionnaire (NYC-Q) and the shift in HR from pre to post-
induction (Δ HR) on left and right amygdala functional connectivity (FC) at baseline (i.e., pre-induction) in Healthy Controls (HC) and patients with Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD).
Lower panel: brain regions showing a significant interaction between the ‘Words’ factor of the New York Cognition Questionnaire (NYC-Q) and the shift in amygdala FC from pre- to post-
induction (Δ FC) in HC and patients with GAD.
Fig. 4. Upper panel: brain regions showing significant
correlations between the ‘Negative’ factor of the New
York Cognition Questionnaire (NYC-Q) and left and
right amygdala functional connectivity (FC) at base-
line (i.e., pre-induction) in Healthy Controls (HC) and
patients with Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD).
Lower panel: brain regions showing significant cor-
relations between the ‘Negative’ factor of the New
York Cognition Questionnaire (NYC-Q) and the shift
in amygdala FC from pre- to post-induction (Δ FC) in
HC and patients with GAD.
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communication between amygdala and other brain areas both at
baseline (before induction) and from pre to post-induction of perse-
verative cognitions. We demonstrated that the use of words during
perseverative cognition significantly correlated with pre- to post-in-
duction changes in amygdala functional connectivity, whereas no sig-
nificant associations emerged for the use of images. The induction en-
gendered higher verbal content of worry, which was associated with
enhanced communication between left amygdala and right precentral
gyrus, an area that has been lately implicated in language and speech
processing, and in the integration of auditory and motor functions
(Glasser and Rilling, 2008). Notably, increased functional connectivity
between amygdala and precentral gyrus has been found in bipolar
disorder (Vizueta et al., 2012) and has been linked to dissociative states
in borderline personality disorder (Krause-Utz et al., 2014).
Given the hypothesized link between verbal worrying and reduced
physiological arousal, we investigated which brain areas mediate both
the use of words and cardiac reactivity in response to a perseverative
cognition induction. As depicted in Fig. 3 (2C), combination of a more
pronounced use of words and a corresponding decrease in heart rate
following the induction were associated with increased functional
connectivity between bilateral amygdala and superior and medial
frontal areas, likely reflecting attempts of an effective top-down control
of the amygdala on emotional arousal as also indicated by other studies
(Etkin et al., 2009). The same pattern of a use of more words, and re-
duced heart rate during worry, was associated with a decrease in
functional connectivity between bilateral amygdala and areas of the
cerebellum. This is not surprising since the cerebellum has direct ana-
tomical connections to the amygdala (Heath and Harper, 1974) and
growing evidence suggest its role in higher cognitive functions
(Schmahmann and Caplan, 2006), verbal working memory (Ng et al.,
2016), emotion (Turner et al., 2007), and avoidant behaviors
(Laricchiuta and Petrosini, 2014). Moreover, significant alterations in
cerebellum functional connectivity have been described in social an-
xiety disorder (Warwick et al., 2008), post-traumatic stress disorder
(Bonne et al., 2003), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Menzies et al.,
2007), and GAD (Blair et al., 2008). It is noteworthy that the cere-
bellum has also direct reciprocal connections to the hypothalamus (for
a review see Zhu et al., 2006), which can influence heart rate reactivity.
Lastly, we observed group differences in some areas that appeared to
mediate the inhibitory control of worry over physiological arousal
(heart rate). For example, only individuals with GAD showed increased
functional connectivity after perseverative cognition induction between
right amygdala and right orbitofrontal cortex, an area that has been
associated with attenuation of negative affect (Banks et al., 2007) again
suggesting inhibitory control exertion by this psychopathological
group.
We also found patterns of functional coupling with the amygdala
that were associated with the negative valence of worrisome thoughts.
In participants with GAD, enhanced baseline functional connectivity
between left amygdala and temporal and central opercular cortex was
also associated with more negative thoughts. Neural activity in the
opercular cortex (with anterior insula) is linked to cardiac interoception
(Critchley et al., 2004). Moreover, biofeedback-guided control of heart
rate is associated with activation of the frontal pole (Jones et al., 2015).
These previous observations suggest our finding may recruitment of
these regions for down-regulation of cardiac arousal by negative
Fig. 5. Upper panel: brain regions showing significant
correlations between the ‘Vague’ factor of the New York
Cognition Questionnaire (NYC-Q) and left and right
amygdala functional connectivity (FC) at baseline (i.e., pre-
induction) in Healthy Controls (HC) and patients with
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD). Lower panel: brain
regions showing significant correlations between the
‘Vague’ factor of the New York Cognition Questionnaire
(NYC-Q) and the shift in amygdala FC from pre- to post-
induction (Δ FC) in HC and patients with GAD.
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worrisome thoughts in patients with GAD.
In both pathological and non-pathological participants, more ne-
gative thoughts after the induction of worry were associated with a
decrease in functional connectivity between right amygdala and ante-
rior cingulate cortex from pre to post-induction. The cingulo-opercular
network includes portions of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and
operculum/insula and anterior thalamus (Dosenbach et al., 2008) and
is implicated in anxiety (Sylvester et al., 2012) in part through its
contribution to maintenance of alertness (Sadaghiani et al., 2009).
The engagement of temporal lobe regions by more negative and
wordy worrisome thoughts provides anatomical insight into theoretical
models of emotional reappraisal, which postulate that frontoparietal
‘control’ regions modulate semantic representations in lateral temporal
cortex to influence emotion-related responses via the amygdala (Buhle
et al., 2014; Ochsner and Gross, 2005, 2007; Ochsner et al., 2012)
implying a crucial contribution of temporal cortices in emotion reg-
ulation (Messina et al., 2015). Moreover, the temporal lobe has a well-
established role in the semantic processing that is important for lan-
guage related processing (Lambon-Ralph et al., 2017; Patterson et al.,
2007). Our data extend this view suggesting that the temporal cortex
has effects at both behavioural and psychophysiological levels that can
impact emotional reappraisal.
The abstract (vague) nature of worry in GAD is widely recognized
(e.g., Stöber and Borkovec, 2002), and underpins notions of ‘reduced
concreteness’ of worry (Stöber et al., 2000). Since abstract sentences
evoke less vivid images when compared to concrete sentences (Paivio,
1991), the reduced concreteness of worrisome thoughts might serve as
a strategy to avoid negative imagery. Contrary to our expectations,
however, we did not observe a correlation between the abstract nature
of worry and state and trait measures of anxiety or states of cardiac
arousal. One possible explanation for this lack of association is perhaps
the constraints of using the NYC-Q questionnaire to study the content
and form of pathological worry. This is first time that the NYC-Q
questionnaire has been applied to a clinical group (patients with GAD)
exhibiting pathological worry. Future studies will help validate it as a
tool in clinical populations. Nevertheless, our approach elicited mean-
ingful results when investigating the brain correlates of the abstract
nature of induced worry. Individuals with more vague worrisome
thoughts exhibited lower right amygdala functional connectivity with
frontal medial cortex. Prior studies suggest that regions of ventromedial
prefrontal cortex are important for generating concrete details from
schematic knowledge (Bonnici et al., 2012; Kumaran et al., 2009; van
Kesteren et al., 2013; Zeithamova et al., 2012). For example, our prior
study found connectivity from the hippocampus is linked to the gen-
eration of more concrete descriptions of personally relevant informa-
tion (Medea et al., 2016). This pattern of connectivity is broadly con-
sistent with a large-scale individual difference investigation, which
found that connectivity from the hippocampus to the posterior cingu-
late cortex was linked to more detailed thoughts (Smallwood et al.,
2016).
Our study findings reinforce the Cognitive Avoidance Theory of
Worry (Borkovec, 1994; Borkovec et al., 2004) by testing and extending
its validity through the study of its brain correlates in GAD and controls.
Importantly, our participants were not directed to worry verbally or in
an imagery form, contrary to approaches adopted by most other studies
investigating the impact of the form of worry on the behaviour. Instead,
the form and content of worry was assessed a posteriori, allowing
participants to engage in their habitual form of worry without being
constrained by instruction. This adds ecological validity to our results.
One limitation of this study is the relatively small sample size, due
to difficulties in asking GAD patients to receive an MRI scan. The pre-
valence of women in the sample reflects the unequal gender distribu-
tion in the GAD and, despite our best attempts at matching patients and
controls, it may have biased the results. Another important limitation is
that our measures of functional connectivity do not allow determining
the direction of causal relationships between brain regions. Such
limitations notwithstanding, our observations provide deeper insight
into differential pathophysiological processes associated with compo-
nent features of worrisome thinking. Moreover we demonstrate a
plausible neurobiological basis for the impact of verbal worry on the
strategic down-regulation of cardiac arousal in patients with GAD.
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